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Generalization in information systems research is important because of the highly applied and vocational nature of the field. However, the concept is often inappropriately and
narrowly confined to one or two views of research. This paper develops the concept of
generalizability as a two-stage process. The
first stage involves creating a general case
from a base case (or cases). The second stage
involves applying the general case to a goal
case. The predominant concern in the information systems literature regards only stage
one generalization. This neglect of the stage
two generalization process leads to oversights in the nature of qualitative generalization. These oversights include varying standards of criteria that apply to different classes
of generalization.

1. Introduction
The term “generalizability” refers to the
usefulness of a theoretical construct outside of its limited domain of known observations. The term refers to a concept
that is laden with conflict for researchers
in information systems (IS). In one
sense, “strict generalizability” is used in
statistic-based studies to indicate the
probable mathematical relationships between observations of phenomena in a
sample and the phenomena in the corresponding population. The term is also
used in a broader sense as a reference to
the “general case”. The general case is an
abstract conceptual phenomenon that
shares certain defined characteristics
with a bounded set of observed phenomena. The broad and strict sense of the
term differ only in the importance of sta-
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tistical sampling for delineating the general case.
For IS research, the broad sense of
generalizability is a key criterion for success. This is because the general case for
any theory is closely related to relevance
and practicability. Relevance regards the
usefulness of research to its audience,
which may include other researchers or
other practitioners. This relevance is an
important criterion for assessing IS research (Keen 1991). “Practicability” is
the ability to place the theory into practice. This ability regards the practical
usefulness of research findings in either
day-to-day or strategic decision making
by IS professionals. Research becomes
generalizable because its usefulness is
apparent (it is relevant), and the mechanics of using it are apparent (it is practicable). This link between generalizability,
through relevance and practicability, is
particularly important to IS research because the IS research field is highly applied, almost vocational in nature (Banville and Landrey 1989):
Science aims at general understanding
rather than at the explanation of individual events. . . . The utility of a social theory or social correlation is enhanced by
its generalizability. The larger the scope
of phenomena it explains, the more useful it is. (Babbie 1990, p. 13, 25)

Because IS is an applied, vocational research field, generalizability is a crucial
aspect in assessing the impact of most IS
research findings. Practitioners can adjust their decisions with regard to this
general case (cf. Cooper 1988). Followon researchers can relate their discoveries to this general case.
Information systems practitioners
generalize their experience intuitively.
Like good consultants, they map their

practical experiences onto any new settings in their search for solutions to their
immediate problems. This map constitutes the characteristics selectively abstracted from previous experiments and
is analogous to our concept of the “general case”. This is a highly applied form
of generalization.
Are all forms of research generalizable? For example, if one conducts a single experiment or an in-depth study of a
single organizational experience, can
this experience be generalized to new organizational settings? Practitioners are
often forced to apply their experience in
this way because a singular similar experience is all they have to drawn upon in
some problem settings. Yet academic researchers seem to operate with more limited acceptance of generalizability:
In other words, generalizability is a quality describing a theory that has been
tested and confirmed in a variety of situations, whether such testing is conducted
through case research, laboratory experiments, statistical experiments or natural
experiments. (Lee 1989)

This limited acceptance seems to suggest
that a valid mapping of previous experience onto new settings is only permissible when the previous experience represents a “variety of situations”. This rules
out the potential value of a “unique” experience, for example, when a particular
problem setting has only occurred once
before, as in case studies (cf. Benbasat et
al. 1987). It also suggests that the findings of research approaches that focus on
unique settings (e.g., ethnographies, action research and interpretive case studies) cannot be applied to new problem
settings. Yet practitioners seem to value
case study research highly, and case
studies are a popular pedagogical tool for
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improving the practical grounding of
business courses.
Clearly there is something faulty in
our understanding of how our information systems research is generalized. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the
philosophical foundation for different
forms of generalization in its broad
sense. We will free the concept from its
undue and improper binding to natural
science research models, and explore the
forms of generalization as they exist in
other popular IS research models. To a
large extent, this paper addresses a domain that is much broader than IS, and
applies to the field of social enquiry as a
whole. However, the vocational nature
of IS makes it quite natural that this critical philosophical groundwork should
emerge from the IS arena.
To accomplish this purpose, we will
first consider the social science assumptions that confuse this issue. Following
this discussion, in section three, we will
discuss the characteristics of the generalization process. In section four, we will
describe the four classes of generalization based on these characteristics. This
will enable us to consider the various criteria for generalization in each of these
classes (section five). The nature of these
criteria are important for IS research because different research modes imply
different standards by which the research
can be measured with regard to these criteria. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the traditions and implications
of such criteria and our four-class view
of generalization.

2. Characteristics of Research
Enquiries
In the natural sciences, the strongest generalizations are theoretical propositions
that entail causal laws-of-nature. Such
causal laws are impossible for the social
sciences. The social sciences must depend on less powerful explanations, such
as probabilistic, genetic and teleological
explanations:
To be sure, the laws or generalizations
concerning social phenomena made
available by current social inquiry are far
more restricted in scope of application,
are formulated far less precisely, and are
acceptable as factually sound only if
understood to be hedged in by a far
larger number of tacit qualifications and
exceptions, than are most of the commonly cited laws of the physical sciences. In this respect, however, the
generalizations of social inquiry do not
appear to differ radically from generalizations currently advanced in domains
usually regarded as unquestionably
respectable subdivisions of natural science C for example, in the study of turbulence phenomena and in embryology.
(Nagel 1969, p. 449).

That is, “less powerful” generalization
should not imply “inoperative” generalization. It is a fallacy to confine causality,
explanation or generalization to a closely
bounded set of scientific assumptions.
The concepts apply quite broadly, and IS
researchers should not dismiss these criteria out-of-hand. The appendix explores
a number of fundamentally contrasting
views of scientific enquiry, all of which,
on both sides of their dichotomies, admit
generalization.
The fundamentally problematic dichotomy lies between nomothetic generalization and idiographic generalization.
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Nomothetic science involves the search
for general laws of nature which hold
with a necessity (cannot be broken) and
permit no genuine exceptions. In contrast, idiographic science involves the
study of particular cases. An idiographic
theory is developed for one case; a
nomothetic theory is developed for an
entire class of cases. Clearly law-like
nomothetic statements entail generalization. Nomothetic “science” like chemistry and physics is sometimes contrasted
with idiographic “enquiry” such as history and geography. Idiographic social
“science”, entailed in the action research, the case studies and the ethnographies popular among IS researchers, is
primarily questioned as science because
these modes of enquiry do not emit lawlike statements.
Much of the work below is concerned
with explicating the manifestation and
nature of this idiographic generalizability. However, before proceeding to this
discussion, it may be useful to examine
the nomothetic dismissal of idiographic
social science, and the corresponding
resignation of the modern scientific
claim by some social inquirers.
Most idiographic methods of enquiry
also tend to fail some of the criteria of the
“normal” or “received” dichotomous positions described in the appendix, such as
objectivism and reductionism. However,
it is the lack of nomothetical findings
that most strongly denies the scientific
nature of idiographic enquiry:
Much of the ‘social theory’ that has
emerged from [the study of human society], in the past as well as the present, is
social and moral philosophy rather than
social science. . . . In consequence, the
property of designating any extant
branch of social inquiry as a ‘real sci-

ence’ has been repeatedly challenged C
commonly on the ground that, although
such inquiries have contributed large
quantities of frequently reliable information about social matters, these contributions are primarily descriptive studies of
special social facts in certain historically
situated human groups, and supply no
strictly universal laws about social phenomena. (Nagel 1969, p. 447-449).

Among social scientists, there is a certain
amount of fratricide over the issue of
nomothetic generalization. Advocates of
specific forms of social enquiry dismiss
the scientific nature of other forms because these other forms lack law-like
generalizability:
Although case studies are conducted in
such a way as to provide detailed information about social units, they are often
criticized as being limited in scope and
not sufficient for meaningful generalizations to be made to larger social aggregates. Again we encounter the problem
of the representativeness of the case.
(Black and Champion 1976, p. 92).

This fratricidal rhetoric can sometimes
lead to narrow, chauvinistic statements
that broadly dismiss much of the body of
social enquiry from any claim to the stature of “science”:
The term ‘truth’ is red meat for philosophers and they are welcome to it. Science
prefers to operate in the less lofty region
of falsifiable statements that can be
tested by evidence, and verifiable observations that can be checked by someone
else. (Hoover 1976, p.40)

Some social researchers have chosen to
leave the generalizability debate by exiting from their claims to any scientific
stature for their social enquiries. At the
extreme position of this idiographic enquiry viewpoint, this equally strident
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contingent is prepared to (rather thankfully) leave behind the “grand narrative”
of science. This postmodern view of
non-scientific social enquiry as a preferred position over the shackles of modern science is itself varied. The two extreme postmodern positions are known
as the “affirmatives” and the “skeptics”
(Rosenau 1992). These two extreme positions differ in their viewpoints on generalization. The affirmatives still hold
causality, explanation and generalization
in limited value. This value is limited by
the multiplicity of truth and local narratives. The skeptics acknowledge complete relativism and no longer regard
constructs like generalization as useful.
We will discuss generalization in
terms that apply to a broad view of social
enquiry. These terms will regard the value of generalization to social enquiry as
part of the grand narrative of science.
These terms will also stretch to regard
the value of generalization for local narratives and multiple readings of the text
of the enquiry. That is, these terms are
relevant to affirmative postmodern science. Our scope reaches its limit at this
boundary. This discussion will have only
limited use in the sense of skeptical postmodernism.

3. Characteristics of Generalization
Typically, we distinguish between two
types of “cases” in the generalization
process. A base case is the setting, or
groups of settings that were the basis for
the research. For example, if a case study
is made in the wire room of Brinks Bank,
the wire room of Brinks Bank at that
time is the base case. If a survey is taken
of 100 Indian IS managers, the 100 Indi-

an IS managers at that time represent the
100 base cases. A general case is an abstract, theoretical case that manifests a
relevant subset of the characteristics of
the base case (or shared characteristics of
the base cases). For example, we might
construct a general case as an imaginary
“typical” Indian IS manager based on
our survey, or an imaginary “typical”
wire room based on our Brinks case
study.
This two-case view of generalization
disregards idiographic research because
it is incomplete. The complete process
involves a third case. This third case, the
goal case, is the application of the general case in some new setting. The goal
case is the application setting for the research findings. For example, we create
a goal case if we predict the behavior of
the IS manager of a New Delhi water
pump distributor based on the general
case in our survey. Likewise, if we redesign the Barclays Bank wire room based
on the general case discovered in the
study of the Brinks wire room, the Barclays wire room is the goal case. The
generalization process implies the creation of at least one chain of all three types
of cases, not just the first two types.
Because the chain involves three
types of case, the generalization process
takes place in two (possibly iterative)
stages. Stage One Generalization involves the creation of the general case
out of the base case (or cases). See 1.
This process could be deductive or inductive. In a deductive model, the general case constructed before the base case
is observed (along with the theory), and
the base case observations are confirmatory. In an inductive model, the base case
is analyzed for relevant characteristics,
perhaps discovered as shared character-
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FIGURE 1. Stage One Generalization

General
Case

Base Case

Researcher

istics among several base cases. The general case is created from this analysis.
Stage Two Generalization involves estimating the behavior of the goal case (or
cases) given the general case, and will
sometimes involve sharing the general
case concepts between the original researchers and other reseachers or practitioners. Even if the original researchers
are also estimating the behavior of the
goal case, this will sometimes involve a
lapse of time and their own shifts in
viewpoint. See 1. In a practical sense,
stage two generalization completes the
mapping process of the practitioner from
experience onto new problem settings.
The general case is embodied in the characteristic-bearing map. The emphasis is
on the goal case, and the general case is
often framed in the context of this goal
case. This is opposite for the original researcher. Researchers usually frame the
general case in the context of the base
case.
This generalization process may be
iterative in that, for stage two generaliza-

tion to be “successful”, the goal case
must consistently share the characteristics predicated on the general case. This
success effectively converts the goal
case into a base case, and reinforces beliefs in the generalized characteristics of
the general case. However, successful
stage two generalization may suggest refinements or adjustments to the general
case because of slight differences between the experiences of the goal case
and the expected experiences based on
the general case. This precipitates a new
round of stage one generalization, as the
general case is modified based on the
newly expanded set of base cases. This
full generalization process is similar in
nature to the double-loop model of organizational learning (Argyris and
Schön 1978). This two-stage process
does not mean that generalizable research requires multiple studies in order
to achieve generalization, any more than
the creation of theory requires theory evolution (i.e., theory-building studies followed by theory-testing studies). Al-
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FIGURE 2. Stage two generalization

General
Case

Researcher

Practitioner or
“Further” Researcher

though an evolving theory implies an
evolving general case, a general case is
implied by any newly created and untested theory. Stage two generalization does
not require a follow-up study (but would
certainly be a component in the conception of a follow-up study). A full generalization does require that the general
case becomes useful. A generalization is
an empirical implication of theorizing
about base cases (stage one), and an inspiration in theorizing about goal cases
(stage two). The general case is negotiated between the two “theorizers”.
There is a close relationship between
the underlying theory and the general
case. From certain viewpoints, the general case is the theory, to the extent that
theory is comprised by covering laws
that describe ordinary linear reality
(DiMaggio 1995). For example, a typical
goal in systems science is an abstract
systemic model of related phenomena.
This abstract model can be defined as the
general case. Sutton and Staw (1995) argue that such a covering-law viewpoint

Goal Case

is too weak to constitute theory because
these provide no supporting narrative
that explain exactly why the general case
appears (cf. Weick 1995). A weak theory
setting may conflate the general case and
theory. In a strong theory setting, the
general case becomes the central empirical implication or projection inferred
from the theory.
A strictly orthodox view of generalization leaves these empirical projects
hanging in space, potentially unwanted
and pragmatically useless. This view
holds that stage one generalization is the
complete process. Such a narrow view
would be inconsistent with the relevance
criterion important to a vocational field
such as information systems. In the IS
field, generalization must entail the second stage, projecting the general case
(e.g., a systemic model) onto goal cases.
There are two dichotomies that characterize a broad view of generalization.
The two dichotomies involve the contrasting positions regarding the basis for
discovering the general case and the goal
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case: universal or idiographic settings. In
a universal setting, the general case is related to a universe of base or goal cases
(or both). In an idiographic setting, the
general case is related only to one particular base or goal case.1
3.1. Universal and Idiographic Stage
One Generalization
The difference between universal and idiographic stage one generalization regards the cardinality between the general
case and the base case population. A
one-to-one relationship between the base
case and the general case (i.e. a single
base case is abstracted to form the general case) is an idiographic stage one generalization. A one-to-many relationship
between the general case and the base
cases is a universal stage one generalization.
Universal stage one generalizations
are made on the foundations of multiple
observations of phenomena. To some degree the general case represents a uniting
or merging of the shared, common characteristics of all of the base cases.
Idiographic stage one generalizations
may represent an abstraction of certain
characteristics of the single base case
and the positing of these as the general
case. On the other hand, idiographic
stage one generalization may suggest
that the base is itself a general case. That
is, there may not only be a one-to-one relationship between the base case and the
general case, the two cases may be
viewed as exactly the same (as in the systems science modelling example mentioned in section two).

3.2. Universal and Idiographic Stage
Two Generalization
The difference between idiographic and
universal stage two generalization regards the cardinality between the general
case and the goal case population. A oneto-one relationship between the base
case and goal case (i.e., the general case
is transformed to suit a single goal case)
is an idiographic stage two generalization. A one-to-many relationship between the general case and the goal cases
is a universal stage two generalization.
Universal stage two generalizations
are made on the assumption that the general case will apply to some bounded
universe of multiple goal cases. The important element here is the presence of
some predefinition of the set of goal cases to which the general case can be applied. A key element in universal stage
two generalization is the description,
specification or delineation of the characteristics of the set of the goal cases.
Usually the goal cases will share all of
the characteristics defined by the general
case, and very little interpretation is necessary by the receiver of the research
findings. In statistical surveys, for example, this element would regard the delineation of the population for which the
sample is purported to represent.
Idiographic stage two generalizations
imply that the second stage of the generalization process is unique to the goal
case. In published research studies, such
idiographic generalization depends on
the reader to interpret the characteristics
of the general case in the context of the
goal case. This is a much more practitioner-oriented mode of generalization.
The researcher to defers the definition of
the goal case to the reader. The important
element here is the lack of any predefini-
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TABLE 3. Four classes of generalization and the cardinality between base, general and goal

cases

Stage Two
Generalization

Stage One Generalization
Universal

Idiographic

Universal

Nomothetic Universal (NU)
base *C general C+ goal

Provisional Universal (PU)
base CC general C+ goal

Idiographic

Deductive Idiographic (DI)
base *C general CC goal

Inductive Idiographic (II)
base CC general CC goal

“CC” symbolizes one-to-one cardinality, “C+” symbolizes one-to-many cardinality.

tion of the set of goal cases to which the
general case can be applied. The researcher will bring out the characteristics
of the general case, but not all of these
characteristics will apply to any particular goal case. The receiver of the research will have to interpret the general
case for each particular goal case. Such
research findings do not deny intrinsically that stage two generalization can take
place, but this stage is deferred to the receiver of the research findings.
Idiographic stage two generalization
is postmodern in the sense that the “reader” is drawn into the hermeneutic interpretation of the general case. Idiographic
stage two generalization implies that the
“meaning” of the general case is deferred
to the audience of the research. The research defines the base case (or cases)
and the general case, but does not define
the goal case (thus completing the stage
one generalization but not the stage two
generalization). The reader contributes
the stage two generalization and establishes the goal case. We will use the term
“deferred generalizability” to refer to
this postponement of the definition of a
goal case. Idiographic stage two generalizations imply deferred generalizability.

4. Four Classes of Generalization
These two dichotomies of idiographic
and universal concepts applied in the two
stages of generalization can be used to
define a four class model of generalization. This model is shown in Table 3. The
horizontal axis of this table is divided
into universal and idiographic stage one
generalization. The vertical axis of this
table is divided into universal and idiographic stage two generalization. These
axes form a four-quadrant classification
system for generalization. Each quadrant
is named in terms of its stage two generalizability, implying the practical relevance and the critical importance of the
second stage in the generalization process. Each of these classes is discussed
briefly below.
4.1. Nomothetic Universal (NU)
Generalization
NU generalization is based on universal
stage one generalization and universal
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a many-to-many
correspondence between the base cases
and the goal cases. Social enquiry research that makes such generalizations
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depends on law-like statements that have
carefully defined base cases and goal
cases. These statements are typically
very formal, quantitative and probabilistic. The primary methods in information
systems that lead to these generalizations
are surveys (Baroudi and Orlikowski
1989) and laboratory experiments (Jarvenpaa et al. 1985) that claim representative samples in a defined population.
The mode of NU generalizations is
the probable determinism in statements
about the goal cases. Error rates are predetermined in the sense that the research
can define its mathematical accuracy in
determining the goal cases. These generalizations are typified by questionnaire
surveys in which a substantial number of
base cases are projected on a population
of goal cases. One example of such studies in IS is published by Igbaria and Baroudi (1995), who surveyed 127 IS development professionals to determine if
women received lower average job performance ratings than men. Their findings are generalized to all women and
men in the IS field (the goal cases), positing the general case the “women experience more restricted career advancement than men” (p. 117).
4.2. Provisional Universal (PU)
Generalization
PU generalization is based on idiographic stage one generalization and universal
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a one-to-many correspondence between a single base case
and a population of goal cases. Social enquiry research that makes such generalizations will depend on a single base case
which is carefully selected on the basis
of its representative characteristics.
Methods that can lead to such generali-

zations include field experiments, natural experiments and case studies. For example, one natural experiment compared
civilian moral in a heavily-bombed city
with an unbombed city to determine the
effect of blanket civilian bombing in
warfare. The result (no effective difference) is generalized in a PU sense to the
universal population of all civilian populations in all cities.
The mode of PU generalizations is
the provisional nature in statements
about the goal cases. Error rates in defining the goal cases and the defining characteristics of the goal cases are virtually
unknown. The generalization is highly
provisional and tentative, posited almost
“temporarily” until further research
more clearly sets the bounds on the population of goal cases. One example of IS
research that adopts such a mode of generalization is the widely-cited case study
published by Orlikowski (1992) in
which she studied the organizational issues raised by a Lotus Notes implementation. The findings are generalized to all
organizations whose groupware premises are incongruent with the culture and
structure (p. 368, the goal cases). Although characterized as exploratory, it is
posited that these elements have significant effects on the early use of the technology (the general case, p. 367).
4.3. Deductive Idiographic (DI)
Generalization
DI generalization is based on universal
stage one generalization and idiographic
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a many-to-one correspondence between multiple base cases and a single goal case. Social enquiry
research that makes such generalizations
will depend on multiple base cases that
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are selected opportunistically rather than
on any basis of representative characteristics. These studies will avoid delineations or characterizations of the population of goal cases. Methods that can typically lead to such generalizations include multiple case studies (that lack
selective criteria), comparative ethnographies, and grounded theory. For example, grounded theory uses “theoretical
sampling” to guide the selection of observations as the research emerges. Multiple base cases are selected purely on the
basis of internal consistency in the general case, with no real regard for any relationship between the goal cases and either the base and general cases.
The mode of DI generalizations is the
importance of the correspondence between the general case and the base cases. No claims are made about the usefulness of the general case for goal cases.
DI generalizations entail deferred generalizability. However, the mode of DI
generalizations is theoretical validity,
and suggest that the theory can be adapted (rather than directly applied) in goal
cases. That is, DI generalizations expect
that the general case must be interpreted
(modified) before it can be useful for any
goal case. Consequently, at the deferred
point of any stage two DI generalization,
the general case has to be corrected or
changed, thus creating a one-to-one correspondence between the general case
and the goal case. Each usable general
case must be deduced from two premises. The first premise is the posited general case in the research. The second
premise is the particular, unique situation
of the goal case.
An example of research assuming
this mode of generalization was published by Applegate (1994). This work

reports a longitudinal, multiple case
study research design involving three
cases (base cases) and describing in
some detail the patterns of change within
the three firms (general case). This pattern included the initiation of structural
change, followed by destabilization and
confrontation, followed by evolutionary
role changes and information systems
changes. However, Applegate defers the
goal case to the reader, allowing the details to “inform” future decisions.
4.4. Inductive Idiographic
Generalization
II generalization is based on idiographic
stage one generalization and idiographic
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a one-to-one correspondence between the base case and a
single goal case. Social enquiry research
that leads to such generalizations will depend on a single in-depth base case that
is selected opportunistically rather than
on any basis of representative characteristics. Like DI generalization, these studies will avoid delineations or characterizations of the population of goal cases.
Methods that can typically lead to such
generalizations include immersive cultural ethnographies, action research and
case studies based on participant observation. For example, action research
evolves its theory through a cycle of organizational stimulation, observation
and evaluation. The theory is highly localized to the unique organizational setting, but implies that the knowledge (the
final theory) might form the basis for
commencing further action research in
other organizations. In action research,
the emerging theory suggests, but does
not prescribe the general case.

R. Baskerville 15

Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 1996

11

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 8 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 1

The mode of II generalizations is the
indistinct nature of the general case. That
is, the mode of II generalizations involves a dependence on holistic consistency between the base case and an
emerging theory. The general case is
largely ignored. II generalization must
be devised almost entirely from the base
case to the goal case. Sometimes the general case is only an implication of the
way that the goal case is being treated
under the light of the base case learning.
That is, at the deferred point of any II
generalization, the general case has to be
holistically created from the base case.
This means that both stages of generalization are deferred. It also means that
there is a strong one-to-one correspondence between the general case and the
goal case. This correspondence may be
so strong that the two cases are effectively the same.
An example of IS research in this
mode is published in Berg et al. (1995).
This is a single case study using participant observation that explored the experiences of IBM in developing an objectoriented architecture for one of its products (the base case). The general case is
drawn in terms of “management lessons”
(like organizational structure) and “technical lessons” (like code bloating). The
goal case is only discussed in terms of
“relevance” to other projects (p. 56), and
this is entirely couched in terms of the
base case characteristics (like developer
and manager experience). It is left entirely to the reader to distinguish between
the base case and the goal case, and determine the relevance of the general case
characteristics to the goal case.

4.5. Four Generalization Classes
The four classes of generalization thus
correspond to the Cartesian product of
two parallel types of two stages of generalization. Universal stage one generalization typically means that the researchers are basing their model on the shared
characteristics of their study subjects, for
example, they may be counting fleas on
dogs. Idiographic stage one generalization means that the researchers are basing their model on one particular subject.
For example, the relationship between a
dog named rover and its fleas (or between a particular flea and its dogs). Universal stage two generalization means
that the researchers are populating their
model with unexamined subjects, for example, suggesting that all dogs have
fleas, or a certain number of fleas, or
have a particular relationship with its
fleas. Idiographic stage two generalization means that the researcher’s model
must be specialized for each unexamined
subject, for example, suggesting that a
cow named bossy will have a relationship with its parasites in some ways similar, but in other ways different, to that of
dog rover and its fleas.

5. Criteria for Generalizability
The acceptance of generalizability in alternative forms of social enquiry does
not imply that researchers become unbounded in their generalizations. The research audience must have a means for
evaluating the effectiveness of any general case posited by researchers. Such
evaluation can be demonstrated by reviewing the traditional mainstream criteria for generalizability of knowledge in
terms of the four classes of generaliza-
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tion. These criteria are reliability and validity (Kirk & Miller 1986). We will
center our discussion on these two rational sets of criteria because these dominate the objective view of science and
social enquiry.2 These criteria are often
narrowly defined for the domain of NU
generalizability, as in Straub (1989), that
describes a model for validating experimental and survey IS research instruments according to their internal validity
and reliability. In this section we will
demonstrate the extension of these criteria that broadly applies to all four classes
of generalization.
5.1. Reliability
Reliability regards the extent to which
observations by multiple researchers
studying the same phenomenon with
similar purposes will yield approximately the same results (Gummesson 1988).
The concept of reliability is closely related to universality, repeatability, and consequently falsifiability. Reliability is a
characteristic that can be attached to observations of goal cases as well as base
cases. Consequently, reliability is a factor in both generalization stages, although each stage may invoke different
types of reliability. There are three types
of reliability: quixotic, diachronic and
synchronic (Kirk and Miller 1986).
Quixotic reliability is the extent to
which a particular method of observation
yields an unvarying measurement. For
example, a broken thermometer is highly
reliable: it always reads the same. A
more qualitative example might be an organization’s policy-defined response
(immediately lowering prices to match
competition) which is always the same.
In a practical sense, deferred generalizability could be wrongly accused of

quixotic reliability on the basis of the research findings, because generalization
is not completed. However, this entails a
narrow view that the generalization
process actually excludes the second
stage, and the argument becomes recursively applicable to all forms of generalization. It could also be argued that almost any base or general case could
prove of some value in an organization
facing a crisis, and that any tool of discovery and analysis might prove equally
valuable. However, this argument also
applies to all forms of generalization,
whether deferred or not. The degree to
which generalizations might embody
quixotic reliability is a criterion that applies equally to all classes of generalization.
Synchronic reliability is the extent to
which observations within the same time
frame are similar. For example, two or
more observers using the same method
of observation of the same phenomenon
would record the same result. This type
of reliability is especially interesting
when it fails because researchers must
discover how multiple, somehow different measures might be simultaneously
true.
Synchronic reliability regards mostly
the stage one generalization process,
since it involves the agreement of several
measures on the strength of the relationship between the base case and the general case. Because each generalization
class handles stage one generalization
somewhat differently, this criterion does
not equally apply to all classes. For example, multiple chains of evidence could
be used in case studies or experiments to
link the base case or base cases to the
general case. This suggests that this criterion would be strongest in, and could
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be equally applied to, the PU and DI
classes. Synchronic reliability is a practical problem in the NU class because
there are typically observations of a large
number of base cases required by the
probability statistics to underwrite the
nomothetic generalization. Synchronic
reliability is also a problem in stage II
generalizations because the stage one
generalization is deferred, and the authors of the enquiry do not draw out the
general case at the time of the study.
Consequently, NU and II classes must be
held to a lower standard of synchronic
reliability than PU and DI classes.
Diachronic reliability is the extent to
which a particular method of observation
yields the same measurement when exposed to a particular phenomenon at different points in time. This regards stability of an observation through time (similarity of measurements or findings taken
at different times). This is the typical
quantitative sense of the term reliability.
It implies that an instrument given to the
same population with no intervening
variables will yield the same results (i.e.,
a test-retest correlation coefficient).
Diachronic reliability regards only
the stage two generalization process in
the sense that the interpretation of the
goal case must occur under the light of
the general case. Consequently, universal stage two generalizations should
have strengths under this criterion owing
to the large population of goal cases. For
example, hypothetico-deductive research methods provide formal evidence
of reliable stage two generalization.
However, even this diachronic reliability
is couched in probability arithmetic, and
any stage two generalization is somewhat tentative. On the other hand, diachronic reliability is even more tentative

in idiographic stage two generalizations
where diachronic reliability is deferred
along with generalizability. Regarding
application of this criterion, NU and PU
forms of generalization can be expected
to have less tentative diachronic reliability (i.e. held to a higher standard) than DI
or II forms of generalization.
5.2. Validity
Validity regards the extent to which an
observation measures what it purports to
measure. Validity means that a theory,
model, or concept accurately describes
reality. Validity is closely related to generalization because it deals with the semantics of the theory. The close relationship between the semantics of the theory
and the semantics of the general case to
both base case and goal case implies that
validity regards both stage one and stage
two generalization.
The concept of validity is easily conflated with the concept of representativeness in survey samples, experimental
subjects and objective case studies. Representativeness is usually couched in
terms of the characteristic similarity of
the base cases to the goal cases. However, this overlooks the intermediary role
of the general case in the process of twostage generalization. The defined effect
is that the general case should be representative of both the base case(s) and the
goal case(s).
Validity can be analyzed using different taxonomies. One taxonomy deals
typically with the semantics of the observational data. There are three types of
validity with regard to the semantics of
the data: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity (Babbie 1983,
Carmines and Zeller 1979). Another taxonomy deals with the causal inferences
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and correlations of the elements of the
theory. This second taxonomy is most
commonly considered in the negative
sense of the failures in the social enquiry:
internal and external invalidity (e.g.,
Campbell and Stanley 1963, Cook and
Campbell 1979).
From our perspective on generalization, these taxonomies overlap because
the semantics of the data and the integrity of the causal inferences are all part of
the process of creating and applying the
general case. To maintain consistency in
our discussion, we will consider the second taxonomy in its positive inverse, and
relate this to the first taxonomy. The two
types of validity that are concerned with
the causal inferences of theory are internal and external validity.
Internal validity is the extent to
which the causal analysis and explanations offered by the theory reflect the reality at the moment of the observations.
Internal validity regards the degree to
which the general case is representative
of the base case(s). Internal validity is often established by exhaustive rejection
of competing or alternative theories and
hypotheses. Internal validity is primarily
a criterion for stage one generalization:
the correspondence of the base case(s)
and the general case. Internal validity entails both content and construct validity.
Content validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) reflect the domain that is intended to be
measured. This regards the fit between
the observations of the social enquiry
and the reality in the base case. Content
validity is also called “apparent” or
“face” validity. For example, a maths
skills test that only covers addition
would lack content validity because subtraction, multiplication & division are ig-

nored. Stage one generalization that
lacks strong content validity would yield
an incomplete and inaccurate general
case. This implies that stage two generalization would eventually fail.
Construct validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) is
related to the theory-under-test. This is
also known as “theoretical validity”, and
“instrumental validity.” Instrumental validity also suggests an indirect observation (an alternative phenomenon) is used
to predict the core phenomenon under
study. Construct validity is critically important when criterion or content validity
cannot be established (often meaning indirect measurement or instruments must
be used). For example, a researcher
might measure participation in schoolrelated activities as an indication of high
levels of self-esteem. Construct validity
also underpins the creation of a correct
general case. If the social enquiry lacks
construct validity, it will produce a general case that is more-or-less unrelated to
the base case(s).
External validity is the extent to
which the causal analysis and explanations offered by the theory may be applied to similar phenomena. External validity is primarily concerned with the
correspondence between the general
case and the goal case. Thus external validity is concerned with the “representativeness” of the general case in terms of
the goal case(s). External validity primarily entails criterion validity, but it may
also imply reliability in objective research since an observation must first be
reliable before external validity can be
shown.
Criterion validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) will
predict some important form of behavior
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(criterion). This definition is also the
common meaning of the term validity,
and is also called “predictive validity”.
Criterion validity is highly achievable
when the observation will be used for aptitude or qualification (for example, a
drivers test is used for predicting driving
skills).
Internal validity is primarily a criterion for stage one generalization, while external validity is primarily a criterion for
stage two generalization. Internal validity is confounded by the conceptual distance between the base case(s) and the
general case. That is, internal validity is
most easily established when there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the
base and general case. When multiple
base cases are introduced, the general
case must be abstracted on shared characteristics raising complications with regard to both construct and content validity. As a result, generalization classes
with idiographic stage one generalization (PU and II generalization) should be
held to a high standard of internal validity. Generalization classes with universal
stage one generalization can typically
only meet lower standards of internal validity.
External validity is primarily a criterion for stage two generalization. External validity is confounded by the conceptual distance between the general case
and the goal case. That is, external validity is most easily established when there
is a one-to-one correspondence between
the general and goal case. When multiple
goal cases are predefined, the general
case must be abstract enough to apply to
all goal cases in the population. This abstraction brings on problems with criterion (predictive) validity. As a result, generalization classes with idiographic stage

two generalization (DI and II generalization) should be held to a high standard of
external validity. Generalization classes
with universal stage two (NU and PU)
generalization can typically only meet
lower standards of internal validity.
5.3. Summary: Standards and
Application of Generalization Criteria
Table 4 summarizes the varied criteria
standards for the four classes of generalization. “Hi Std” represents the a high
standard of this criterion (i.e. highly
achievable) for this class of method. “Lo
Std” represents a low standard of this criterion (i.e. less achievable) for this class
of method. This figure captures the implication that no single class of generalization holds an ideal solution to this important process in social enquiry. This
analysis contradicts the commonly held
perception that NU generalizations (e.g.,
representative-sample statistical questionnaire surveys) provide ideally generalizable research findings, and qualitative forms of research (e.g., action research or case studies) do not provide
generalizable findings at all. To the contrary, NU class generalizations have the
narrowest criteria standards of all four
classes. PU class generalizations, which
include in-depth case studies as well as
experiments, have the broadest criteria
standards for generalizations. To be fair,
no single class can lay claim to offering
the “only” or “best” generalization
mode, but each class has a different intent for its generalizations, and appeals
to different criteria.
These standards are applicable during the evaluation of various forms of social enquiry. For example, a one-shot
survey questionnaire research project,
which examines a random sample of IS
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TABLE 4. Criteria standards for classes of generalization

Stage Two
Generalization

Universal

Idiographic

Stage One Generalization
Universal

Idiographic

Nomothetic Universal (NU)

Provisional Universal (PU)

Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Lo Std
Diachronic Reliability: Hi Std
Internal Validity: Lo Std
External Validity: Lo Std

Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Hi Std
Diachronic Reliability: Hi Std
Internal Validity: Hi Std
External Validity: Lo Std

Deductive Idiographic (DI)

Inductive Idiographic (II)

Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Hi Std
Diachronic Reliability: Lo Std
Internal Validity: Lo Std
External Validity: Hi Std

Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Lo Std
Diachronic Reliability: Lo Std
Internal Validity: Hi Std
External Validity: Hi Std

organizations in Denmark regarding the
type of development method used in the
organization, might enable the researchers to make probabilistic statements
about development methods in all Danish IS organizations. The criteria for
judging the generalizable knowledge in
such a NU study should conform to the
upper left-hand quadrant of Table 4. The
most important criteria are non-quixotic
reliability and diachronic reliability.
These criteria are typically addressed by
pre-testing the instruments and statistically evaluating the sampling error (statistical significance). However, a longitudinal study would improve the quality
considerably on both criteria. The nature
of the research is such that it would be inappropriate to heavily criticize such
studies on the basis of their synchronic
reliability (it is impractical to make multiple simultaneous measures of a large
number of subjects with any meaningfulness) or their validity (it is very difficult

to certify exactly how each of a large
number of diverse subjects interpreted
each survey item). These particular criteria are not the basis from which the researchers are accrediting the generalizability of their findings.
As another example, a laboratory experiment in which student subjects are
tested for comprehension after reading
video screen information in particular
color combinations might be used to suggest ideal default screen colors for all
software products. The criteria for judging the generalizability of such a PU
study should conform to the upper righthand quadrant of Table 4. Such studies
should meet high quality standards for
all forms of reliability and validity except external validity. In other words, it
would be reasonable to expect careful
validation of measurement instruments
to eliminate quixotic reliability and establish both content and construct validity in the observations. Multiple simulta-
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neous measures and repetitive experimentation are also reasonable expectations. However, it is unreasonable to
attack this research on the basis of its external and criterion validity, for example,
by positing that students in laboratory
settings will behave differently than professionals in office settings. This is unreasonable because this kind of criteria is
not the basis for the generalizability of
knowledge in this class of study.
A third example might be a multiple
case study in which managers and programmers in several software companies
are interviewed about the practical importance of object-oriented system development techniques. The study would
no doubt analyze general differences between the companies (size, organization,
corporate culture, products, etc.) along
with the analysis of differences and similarities in interview contents. One
would expect to hold this kind of DI
study to the criteria pattern found in the
lower left-hand quadrant of Table 4. For
example, the interview contents should
be not be quixotic, there should be multiple chains of evidence (for example,
several confirmational programmer interviews with each subject company) for
synchronic reliability, and the general
analysis should make external and criterion validity clear (what kinds of companies are involved). Strongly criticizing
such studies on the basis of their diachronic reliability (case studies cannot
be repeated because of the changing nature of organizations and their actors), or
internal validity (the interpretive nature
of observations in multiple case studies
make this construct very difficult to
prove) amounts to an attack on these
kinds of studies in general, rather than
the particular study in question.

A fourth example might be an action
research study in which a collaborative
team studies administrative congestion
problems in a multi-organizational
bridge-construction project, ultimately
developing a document tracking system
as the solution. This kind of II study
should be held to the criteria pattern
found in the lower right-hand quadrant
of Table 4. This work may be judged
strongly on its validity, both internal and
external. For example, convincing evidence should be presented that the team
was engaged in the stated problem, that
the theoretical elements were actually in
use, and that enough details are provided
about the subject organization such that
readers can confidently project the learning into another, quite dissimilar problem setting. Holding such studies up to
high standards of synchronic reliability
(the participative nature of action research obstructs the verification of objective observations) or diachronic reliability (neither the organization nor any
particular set of its contemporary problems can be repeated) would be quite irrelevant to the class of generalization
that underlies this study.
The correlation between these classes of generalization and specific methods of social enquiry is somewhat idealized. While we may discuss idealized
forms research methods (e.g., “the” case
study research method or “the” sampling
survey method), these often vary in practice. Data collection or analytical techniques normally associated with one idealized method may be correctly used
within another idealized method (e.g.,
using participant observation to collect
survey data, or using questionnaires to
collect case study data). In practice,
ground-breaking research can be a
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messy, unstructured process (Root-Bernstein 1989). Applying these generalization criteria may require examining the
underlying claims for validity and reliability in cases where the exact method of
enquiry is atypical.

6. Discussion
Qualitative social science has bristled
over the generalization issue for some
time. Our understanding of generalizability has not been helped by the narrow
view of social scientific enquiry adopted
by many textbooks. For example, Black
and Champion (1976) premised that “research should suggest a general set of
phenomena to which the theory applies.
This enables falsifiability by proposing
cases which provide subsequent observations.” This viewpoint admits only the
Popperian view of social scientific enquiry and leads to an unsound dismissal
of the practical value of qualitative research.
The opposing views in the qualitative
science “camp” have appeared in the literature, but these have not been as collectively coherent as the critics. Yin, for
example, suggests that case studies are
generalizable, but like experiments are
generalizable: to theory, not to a population:
This analogy to samples and universes is
incorrect when dealing with case studies.
… A common complaint about case
studies is that it is difficult to generalize
from one case to another. Thus analysts
fall into the trap of trying to select a ‘representative’ case or set of cases. Yet no
set of cases, no matter how large, is
likely to deal satisfactorily with the complaint. The problem lies in the very

notion of generalizing to other case studies. Instead, an analyst should try to generalize findings to ‘theory,’ analogous to
the way a scientist generalizes from
experimental results to theory. (Note that
the scientist does not attempt to select
‘representative’ experiments.) (Yin
1989, p.43-44)

Yin goes on to discuss an example of this
generalization to theory, citing Jacobs
(1961) as an illustration. Jacobs’ book
developed a theory of urban planning by
organizing cases into categories like the
role of sidewalks, the role of neighborhood parks, etc.
Gummesson (1988) provided an
analysis that noted different standards of
criteria for qualitative versus quantitative research. He found that reliability is
the favorite criterion of quantitative science because it fulfills three roles: curb
erroneous research, make the logic explicit, and form a “validity crutch” (replace validity with reliability when the
former is beyond reach). He also noticed
that reliability is problematic in qualitative studies because it is impossible to
replicate rich, multivariate social events
that form the subject of the observations.
Diachronic reliability is unreachable,
since events cannot be repeated. Synchronic reliability, however, is possible
in two senses. First, multiple observers
can be used to triangulate on the meaning
in the observation. Second, the “observation” can be removed from the social
event. The observation can be made regarding the raw documentation taken
from the event (transcripts, audio tapes,
diaries).
Gummesson also noticed that validity is the favorite criterion of qualitative
science because the limited number of
observations permit more detailed link-
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ages between the theory and a particular
phenomenon. The direct, interpretive observation techniques eliminate problems
of instrumental validity. Most qualitative
research infers the theory directly from
the observed data (ex post facto hypothesizing) which means that construct and
content validity are almost automatically
present. Further, the language of the theory is often freed from mathematics.
This can promote external validity by allowing broader conceptual descriptions
or “useful ambiguity” that permit slightly differing phenomena to be grouped
into one analytical class.
Gummesson noted that validity is
problematic for quantitative studies, particularly when the underlying subject of
study may be undergoing transformational processes. That is, the subject of
study may be a social process, and social
processes continually change in nature.
This means validation must be a continuing process and diachronic reliability is
problematic. Since validity may have to
be reestablished with each observation,
the theoretical constructs may change
with each observation.
The problem with all of these views
has been the failure in considering the
complete generalization process. Generalization has heretofore been deemed as
only the process of creating the general
case. As argued here, however, this is
only the first stage of the generalization
process. The complete process of generalization must include the projection of
the general case into a goal case. When
this complete process is considered, a
more balanced view of social enquiry
takes shape. In this view, the practical
sense of generalization becomes universal across the full range of social scientific methodology. Importantly, by using

this view, we can describe the appropriate criteria by which to judge the generalizability of differing classes of social
enquiry.

Notes
1A

strict dichotomy between idiographic and universal settings is conceptual to a large degree. Most
research can be interpreted as occupying some
position along a continuum from conceptually
ideal idiography to conceptually ideal universality.

2There

are also naturalistic criteria for generalizations, such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
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Appendix
There are various fundamental dichotomies in the philosophy of science that affect how the scientist discovers causal
relationships, explanations, and as a consequence, the general cases. However,
few of these dichotomies involve any argument on either side that denies causality, explanation or generalization. It is
fallacious to assume that generalization
is a concept that is peculiar to certain
narrow scientific viewpoints. This appendix explores and supports our assumption that generalization is a relevant
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criterion in both aspects of many scientific dichotomies. Basing the definitions
of these dichotomous positions on Flew
(1979) and Bullock and Stallybrass
(1977), we will consider some examples
below:
Objective and Subjective Generalization
Objective science regards a scientific
theory as one that takes shared experience to be the sole foundation of factual
knowledge. Subjective science is a contrasting position that regards a scientific
theory as one that takes private experience to be the sole foundation of factual
knowledge. Neither position actually denies causal relationships or explanation
and general cases exist in both modes of
thinking.
Empirical and Rational Generalization
Empirical science assumes that all
knowledge is derived from experience;
and that a linguistic expression is significant only if associated by rule with
something that can be experienced. Rational science assumes that our knowledge of the nature of what exists may be
obtained by reason alone; and that everything is explicable in a single system of
knowledge. Neither position involves
any denial of causality, explanatory expressions or generalization.
Realist and Idealist Generalization
Realist science, in the sense that physical
objects exist independently of being perceived, can be contrasted with idealist
science. Idealism assumes that the external world is somehow created by the
mind. Certainly realist science entails
causality and generalization. In idealist
science, the discovery of co-related phenomena (or appearances), and conse-

quently generalization are allowed under
Hegel’s objective Idealism (the monistic,
absolute mind), Kant’s transcendental
idealism, and especially under Berkeley’s monistic “mind-of-God” view.
Realist and Nominalist Generalization
Realist science also typically assumes
that universals have a real substantial existence independently of being thought.
This also contrasts with nominalist science which assumes that universals are
merely names and have no existence independently of being thought. In this
case both positions actually seek to define the nature of generalization, and differ only in their opinion of its nature.
That is, realist science assumes the general case is a set of cases with an independent existence. Nominalist science
assumes the general case is merely an
idea that we have attached to some of our
impressions.
Reductionist and Holist Generalization
Reductionist science regards a doctrine
that claims to reduce the apparently more
sophisticated and complex to the less so.
Holist science holds that some wholes
are more than the sum of their parts. Reductionist science seeks explanations
and generalization through a systematic
practice whereby concepts are redefined
or analyzed in terms of more elementary
or basic concepts. Holist science explains parts only in terms of their functions in the whole, and wholes necessarily have characteristics that cannot be explained by the properties and relations of
their constituents. This view defines its
generalizations in terms of this partswhole relationship.
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Inductive and Deductive Generalization
Inductive science involves a method of
reasoning by which a general law or
principle is inferred from observed particular instances. Deductive science assumes that all valid arguments are those
in which it is impossible to assert the
premises and deny the conclusion without contradicting oneself. Deductive science establishes an hypothesis, which
can be expressed with deductive logic
and then tested against observations in
reality. Inductive science derives the hypothesis from observations in reality.
Both settings seek relationships between
variable elements, implying causality
and the search for generalization.

Positivist and Relativist Generalization
Positivist science also holds that knowledge must be accepted as we find it, and
is not further explicable. This position
contrasts with relativist science, which
holds that beliefs and principles have no
universal or timeless validity; that is,
there is no such thing as objective knowledge independent of the knower. Positivist science poses generalizations that are
held to a certain permanence. Relativist
generalizations are limited to the particular age, social group, or individual
holding such beliefs. However, both positions admit generalization.

Positivist and Interpretivist
Generalization
Positivism and interpretivism are terms
that are often used very broadly. In one
sense, positivism implies that all true
knowledge is scientific C describing the
coexistence and succession of observable phenomena. In contrast, interpretivism assumes that all observable phenomena are subjectively interpreted in a cognitive process beyond the control of the
observer. Positivist generalizations
emerge from the observations, and philosophy is limited to explaining the
scope and methods of making positive
observations. Interpretivist generalizations emerge from agreements about observations. These agreements represent
contemporary linguistic conventions
about the meaning of the observation. Interpretivist philosophy offers means for
obtaining generalizations that are not
available to science from direct observations. However, both positions adopt
generalizations
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